Mercurial > hg > nginx-quic
view src/core/ngx_proxy_protocol.c @ 6982:ac9b1df5b246
SSL: disabled renegotiation detection in client mode.
CVE-2009-3555 is no longer relevant and mitigated by the renegotiation
info extension (secure renegotiation). On the other hand, unexpected
renegotiation still introduces potential security risks, and hence we do
not allow renegotiation on the server side, as we never request renegotiation.
On the client side the situation is different though. There are backends
which explicitly request renegotiation, and disabled renegotiation
introduces interoperability problems. This change allows renegotiation
on the client side, and fixes interoperability problems as observed with
such backends (ticket #872).
Additionally, with TLSv1.3 the SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START flag is currently set
by OpenSSL when receiving a NewSessionTicket message, and was detected by
nginx as a renegotiation attempt. This looks like a bug in OpenSSL, though
this change also allows better interoperability till the problem is fixed.
author | Sergey Kandaurov <pluknet@nginx.com> |
---|---|
date | Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:08:44 +0300 |
parents | b3b7e33083ac |
children | 416953ef0428 |
line wrap: on
line source
/* * Copyright (C) Roman Arutyunyan * Copyright (C) Nginx, Inc. */ #include <ngx_config.h> #include <ngx_core.h> u_char * ngx_proxy_protocol_read(ngx_connection_t *c, u_char *buf, u_char *last) { size_t len; u_char ch, *p, *addr, *port; ngx_int_t n; p = buf; len = last - buf; if (len < 8 || ngx_strncmp(p, "PROXY ", 6) != 0) { goto invalid; } p += 6; len -= 6; if (len >= 7 && ngx_strncmp(p, "UNKNOWN", 7) == 0) { ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_CORE, c->log, 0, "PROXY protocol unknown protocol"); p += 7; goto skip; } if (len < 5 || ngx_strncmp(p, "TCP", 3) != 0 || (p[3] != '4' && p[3] != '6') || p[4] != ' ') { goto invalid; } p += 5; addr = p; for ( ;; ) { if (p == last) { goto invalid; } ch = *p++; if (ch == ' ') { break; } if (ch != ':' && ch != '.' && (ch < 'a' || ch > 'f') && (ch < 'A' || ch > 'F') && (ch < '0' || ch > '9')) { goto invalid; } } len = p - addr - 1; c->proxy_protocol_addr.data = ngx_pnalloc(c->pool, len); if (c->proxy_protocol_addr.data == NULL) { return NULL; } ngx_memcpy(c->proxy_protocol_addr.data, addr, len); c->proxy_protocol_addr.len = len; for ( ;; ) { if (p == last) { goto invalid; } if (*p++ == ' ') { break; } } port = p; for ( ;; ) { if (p == last) { goto invalid; } if (*p++ == ' ') { break; } } len = p - port - 1; n = ngx_atoi(port, len); if (n < 0 || n > 65535) { goto invalid; } c->proxy_protocol_port = (in_port_t) n; ngx_log_debug2(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_CORE, c->log, 0, "PROXY protocol address: %V %i", &c->proxy_protocol_addr, n); skip: for ( /* void */ ; p < last - 1; p++) { if (p[0] == CR && p[1] == LF) { return p + 2; } } invalid: ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, c->log, 0, "broken header: \"%*s\"", (size_t) (last - buf), buf); return NULL; } u_char * ngx_proxy_protocol_write(ngx_connection_t *c, u_char *buf, u_char *last) { ngx_uint_t port, lport; if (last - buf < NGX_PROXY_PROTOCOL_MAX_HEADER) { return NULL; } if (ngx_connection_local_sockaddr(c, NULL, 0) != NGX_OK) { return NULL; } switch (c->sockaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: buf = ngx_cpymem(buf, "PROXY TCP4 ", sizeof("PROXY TCP4 ") - 1); break; #if (NGX_HAVE_INET6) case AF_INET6: buf = ngx_cpymem(buf, "PROXY TCP6 ", sizeof("PROXY TCP6 ") - 1); break; #endif default: return ngx_cpymem(buf, "PROXY UNKNOWN" CRLF, sizeof("PROXY UNKNOWN" CRLF) - 1); } buf += ngx_sock_ntop(c->sockaddr, c->socklen, buf, last - buf, 0); *buf++ = ' '; buf += ngx_sock_ntop(c->local_sockaddr, c->local_socklen, buf, last - buf, 0); port = ngx_inet_get_port(c->sockaddr); lport = ngx_inet_get_port(c->local_sockaddr); return ngx_slprintf(buf, last, " %ui %ui" CRLF, port, lport); }