Mercurial > hg > nginx-quic
view src/core/ngx_shmtx.h @ 6982:ac9b1df5b246
SSL: disabled renegotiation detection in client mode.
CVE-2009-3555 is no longer relevant and mitigated by the renegotiation
info extension (secure renegotiation). On the other hand, unexpected
renegotiation still introduces potential security risks, and hence we do
not allow renegotiation on the server side, as we never request renegotiation.
On the client side the situation is different though. There are backends
which explicitly request renegotiation, and disabled renegotiation
introduces interoperability problems. This change allows renegotiation
on the client side, and fixes interoperability problems as observed with
such backends (ticket #872).
Additionally, with TLSv1.3 the SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START flag is currently set
by OpenSSL when receiving a NewSessionTicket message, and was detected by
nginx as a renegotiation attempt. This looks like a bug in OpenSSL, though
this change also allows better interoperability till the problem is fixed.
author | Sergey Kandaurov <pluknet@nginx.com> |
---|---|
date | Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:08:44 +0300 |
parents | 512c741fa841 |
children |
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/* * Copyright (C) Igor Sysoev * Copyright (C) Nginx, Inc. */ #ifndef _NGX_SHMTX_H_INCLUDED_ #define _NGX_SHMTX_H_INCLUDED_ #include <ngx_config.h> #include <ngx_core.h> typedef struct { ngx_atomic_t lock; #if (NGX_HAVE_POSIX_SEM) ngx_atomic_t wait; #endif } ngx_shmtx_sh_t; typedef struct { #if (NGX_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS) ngx_atomic_t *lock; #if (NGX_HAVE_POSIX_SEM) ngx_atomic_t *wait; ngx_uint_t semaphore; sem_t sem; #endif #else ngx_fd_t fd; u_char *name; #endif ngx_uint_t spin; } ngx_shmtx_t; ngx_int_t ngx_shmtx_create(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx, ngx_shmtx_sh_t *addr, u_char *name); void ngx_shmtx_destroy(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx); ngx_uint_t ngx_shmtx_trylock(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx); void ngx_shmtx_lock(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx); void ngx_shmtx_unlock(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx); ngx_uint_t ngx_shmtx_force_unlock(ngx_shmtx_t *mtx, ngx_pid_t pid); #endif /* _NGX_SHMTX_H_INCLUDED_ */