Mercurial > hg > nginx-quic
view src/os/unix/ngx_channel.c @ 6982:ac9b1df5b246
SSL: disabled renegotiation detection in client mode.
CVE-2009-3555 is no longer relevant and mitigated by the renegotiation
info extension (secure renegotiation). On the other hand, unexpected
renegotiation still introduces potential security risks, and hence we do
not allow renegotiation on the server side, as we never request renegotiation.
On the client side the situation is different though. There are backends
which explicitly request renegotiation, and disabled renegotiation
introduces interoperability problems. This change allows renegotiation
on the client side, and fixes interoperability problems as observed with
such backends (ticket #872).
Additionally, with TLSv1.3 the SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START flag is currently set
by OpenSSL when receiving a NewSessionTicket message, and was detected by
nginx as a renegotiation attempt. This looks like a bug in OpenSSL, though
this change also allows better interoperability till the problem is fixed.
author | Sergey Kandaurov <pluknet@nginx.com> |
---|---|
date | Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:08:44 +0300 |
parents | 3377f9459e99 |
children |
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/* * Copyright (C) Igor Sysoev * Copyright (C) Nginx, Inc. */ #include <ngx_config.h> #include <ngx_core.h> #include <ngx_channel.h> ngx_int_t ngx_write_channel(ngx_socket_t s, ngx_channel_t *ch, size_t size, ngx_log_t *log) { ssize_t n; ngx_err_t err; struct iovec iov[1]; struct msghdr msg; #if (NGX_HAVE_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL) union { struct cmsghdr cm; char space[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsg; if (ch->fd == -1) { msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; } else { msg.msg_control = (caddr_t) &cmsg; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg); ngx_memzero(&cmsg, sizeof(cmsg)); cmsg.cm.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); cmsg.cm.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg.cm.cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; /* * We have to use ngx_memcpy() instead of simple * *(int *) CMSG_DATA(&cmsg.cm) = ch->fd; * because some gcc 4.4 with -O2/3/s optimization issues the warning: * dereferencing type-punned pointer will break strict-aliasing rules * * Fortunately, gcc with -O1 compiles this ngx_memcpy() * in the same simple assignment as in the code above */ ngx_memcpy(CMSG_DATA(&cmsg.cm), &ch->fd, sizeof(int)); } msg.msg_flags = 0; #else if (ch->fd == -1) { msg.msg_accrights = NULL; msg.msg_accrightslen = 0; } else { msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t) &ch->fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(int); } #endif iov[0].iov_base = (char *) ch; iov[0].iov_len = size; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; n = sendmsg(s, &msg, 0); if (n == -1) { err = ngx_errno; if (err == NGX_EAGAIN) { return NGX_AGAIN; } ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, err, "sendmsg() failed"); return NGX_ERROR; } return NGX_OK; } ngx_int_t ngx_read_channel(ngx_socket_t s, ngx_channel_t *ch, size_t size, ngx_log_t *log) { ssize_t n; ngx_err_t err; struct iovec iov[1]; struct msghdr msg; #if (NGX_HAVE_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL) union { struct cmsghdr cm; char space[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsg; #else int fd; #endif iov[0].iov_base = (char *) ch; iov[0].iov_len = size; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; #if (NGX_HAVE_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL) msg.msg_control = (caddr_t) &cmsg; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg); #else msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t) &fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(int); #endif n = recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); if (n == -1) { err = ngx_errno; if (err == NGX_EAGAIN) { return NGX_AGAIN; } ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, err, "recvmsg() failed"); return NGX_ERROR; } if (n == 0) { ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_CORE, log, 0, "recvmsg() returned zero"); return NGX_ERROR; } if ((size_t) n < sizeof(ngx_channel_t)) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, 0, "recvmsg() returned not enough data: %z", n); return NGX_ERROR; } #if (NGX_HAVE_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL) if (ch->command == NGX_CMD_OPEN_CHANNEL) { if (cmsg.cm.cmsg_len < (socklen_t) CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, 0, "recvmsg() returned too small ancillary data"); return NGX_ERROR; } if (cmsg.cm.cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg.cm.cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, 0, "recvmsg() returned invalid ancillary data " "level %d or type %d", cmsg.cm.cmsg_level, cmsg.cm.cmsg_type); return NGX_ERROR; } /* ch->fd = *(int *) CMSG_DATA(&cmsg.cm); */ ngx_memcpy(&ch->fd, CMSG_DATA(&cmsg.cm), sizeof(int)); } if (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CTRUNC)) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, 0, "recvmsg() truncated data"); } #else if (ch->command == NGX_CMD_OPEN_CHANNEL) { if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(int)) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, 0, "recvmsg() returned no ancillary data"); return NGX_ERROR; } ch->fd = fd; } #endif return n; } ngx_int_t ngx_add_channel_event(ngx_cycle_t *cycle, ngx_fd_t fd, ngx_int_t event, ngx_event_handler_pt handler) { ngx_event_t *ev, *rev, *wev; ngx_connection_t *c; c = ngx_get_connection(fd, cycle->log); if (c == NULL) { return NGX_ERROR; } c->pool = cycle->pool; rev = c->read; wev = c->write; rev->log = cycle->log; wev->log = cycle->log; rev->channel = 1; wev->channel = 1; ev = (event == NGX_READ_EVENT) ? rev : wev; ev->handler = handler; if (ngx_add_conn && (ngx_event_flags & NGX_USE_EPOLL_EVENT) == 0) { if (ngx_add_conn(c) == NGX_ERROR) { ngx_free_connection(c); return NGX_ERROR; } } else { if (ngx_add_event(ev, event, 0) == NGX_ERROR) { ngx_free_connection(c); return NGX_ERROR; } } return NGX_OK; } void ngx_close_channel(ngx_fd_t *fd, ngx_log_t *log) { if (close(fd[0]) == -1) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, ngx_errno, "close() channel failed"); } if (close(fd[1]) == -1) { ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, log, ngx_errno, "close() channel failed"); } }