Mercurial > hg > nginx
diff src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_tokens.c @ 8752:e19723c40d28 quic
QUIC: separate files for tokens related processing.
author | Vladimir Homutov <vl@nginx.com> |
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date | Tue, 13 Apr 2021 14:41:52 +0300 |
parents | |
children | b4e6b7049984 |
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new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/event/quic/ngx_event_quic_tokens.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ + +/* + * Copyright (C) Nginx, Inc. + */ + + +#include <ngx_config.h> +#include <ngx_core.h> +#include <ngx_event.h> +#include <ngx_sha1.h> +#include <ngx_event_quic_protection.h> + + +#define NGX_QUIC_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE 64 + /* SHA-1(addr)=20 + sizeof(time_t) + retry(1) + odcid.len(1) + odcid */ + + +static void ngx_quic_address_hash(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_uint_t no_port, + u_char buf[20]); + + +ngx_int_t +ngx_quic_new_sr_token(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_str_t *cid, u_char *secret, + u_char *token) +{ + ngx_str_t tmp; + + tmp.data = secret; + tmp.len = NGX_QUIC_SR_KEY_LEN; + + if (ngx_quic_derive_key(c->log, "sr_token_key", &tmp, cid, token, + NGX_QUIC_SR_TOKEN_LEN) + != NGX_OK) + { + return NGX_ERROR; + } + +#if (NGX_DEBUG) + ngx_log_debug2(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, c->log, 0, + "quic stateless reset token %*xs", + (size_t) NGX_QUIC_SR_TOKEN_LEN, token); +#endif + + return NGX_OK; +} + + +ngx_int_t +ngx_quic_new_token(ngx_connection_t *c, u_char *key, ngx_str_t *token, + ngx_str_t *odcid, time_t exp, ngx_uint_t is_retry) +{ + int len, iv_len; + u_char *p, *iv; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + + u_char in[NGX_QUIC_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE]; + + ngx_quic_address_hash(c, !is_retry, in); + + p = in + 20; + + p = ngx_cpymem(p, &exp, sizeof(time_t)); + + *p++ = is_retry ? 1 : 0; + + if (odcid) { + *p++ = odcid->len; + p = ngx_cpymem(p, odcid->data, odcid->len); + + } else { + *p++ = 0; + } + + len = p - in; + + cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); + iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); + + token->len = iv_len + len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher); + token->data = ngx_pnalloc(c->pool, token->len); + if (token->data == NULL) { + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + iv = token->data; + + if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 + || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv)) + { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + token->len = iv_len; + + if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, token->data + token->len, &len, in, len) != 1) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + token->len += len; + + if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, token->data + token->len, &len) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + token->len += len; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + +#ifdef NGX_QUIC_DEBUG_PACKETS + ngx_log_debug2(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, c->log, 0, + "quic new token len:%uz %xV", token->len, token); +#endif + + return NGX_OK; +} + + +static void +ngx_quic_address_hash(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_uint_t no_port, u_char buf[20]) +{ + size_t len; + u_char *data; + ngx_sha1_t sha1; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; +#if (NGX_HAVE_INET6) + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; +#endif + + len = (size_t) c->socklen; + data = (u_char *) c->sockaddr; + + if (no_port) { + switch (c->sockaddr->sa_family) { + +#if (NGX_HAVE_INET6) + case AF_INET6: + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) c->sockaddr; + + len = sizeof(struct in6_addr); + data = sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; + + break; +#endif + + case AF_INET: + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) c->sockaddr; + + len = sizeof(in_addr_t); + data = (u_char *) &sin->sin_addr; + + break; + } + } + + ngx_sha1_init(&sha1); + ngx_sha1_update(&sha1, data, len); + ngx_sha1_final(buf, &sha1); +} + + +ngx_int_t +ngx_quic_validate_token(ngx_connection_t *c, u_char *key, + ngx_quic_header_t *pkt) +{ + int len, tlen, iv_len; + u_char *iv, *p; + time_t now, exp; + size_t total; + ngx_str_t odcid; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + + u_char addr_hash[20]; + u_char tdec[NGX_QUIC_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE]; + + /* Retry token or NEW_TOKEN in a previous connection */ + + cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); + iv = pkt->token.data; + iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); + + /* sanity checks */ + + if (pkt->token.len < (size_t) iv_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher)) { + goto garbage; + } + + if (pkt->token.len > (size_t) iv_len + NGX_QUIC_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE) { + goto garbage; + } + + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv)) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + p = pkt->token.data + iv_len; + len = pkt->token.len - iv_len; + + if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tdec, &len, p, len) != 1) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + goto garbage; + } + total = len; + + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, tdec + len, &tlen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + goto garbage; + } + total += tlen; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (total < (20 + sizeof(time_t) + 2)) { + goto garbage; + } + + p = tdec + 20; + + ngx_memcpy(&exp, p, sizeof(time_t)); + p += sizeof(time_t); + + pkt->retried = (*p++ == 1); + + ngx_quic_address_hash(c, !pkt->retried, addr_hash); + + if (ngx_memcmp(tdec, addr_hash, 20) != 0) { + goto bad_token; + } + + odcid.len = *p++; + if (odcid.len) { + if (odcid.len > NGX_QUIC_MAX_CID_LEN) { + goto bad_token; + } + + if ((size_t)(tdec + total - p) < odcid.len) { + goto bad_token; + } + + odcid.data = p; + p += odcid.len; + } + + now = ngx_time(); + + if (now > exp) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, c->log, 0, "quic expired token"); + return NGX_DECLINED; + } + + if (odcid.len) { + pkt->odcid.len = odcid.len; + pkt->odcid.data = ngx_pstrdup(c->pool, &odcid); + if (pkt->odcid.data == NULL) { + return NGX_ERROR; + } + + } else { + pkt->odcid = pkt->dcid; + } + + pkt->validated = 1; + + return NGX_OK; + +garbage: + + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, c->log, 0, "quic garbage token"); + + return NGX_ABORT; + +bad_token: + + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, c->log, 0, "quic invalid token"); + + return NGX_DECLINED; +}