# HG changeset patch
# User Maxim Dounin <mdounin@mdounin.ru>
# Date 1436825425 -10800
# Node ID 595b179e429f9723417c1ecedddc43b738572a39
# Parent  dcae651b2a0cbd3de2f1fd5cf5b8c72627db94fd
OCSP stapling: fixed segfault without nextUpdate.

OCSP responses may contain no nextUpdate.  As per RFC 6960, this means
that nextUpdate checks should be bypassed.  Handle this gracefully by
using NGX_MAX_TIME_T_VALUE as "valid" in such a case.

The problem was introduced by 6893a1007a7c (1.9.2).

Reported by Matthew Baldwin.

diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c
@@ -637,11 +637,16 @@ ngx_ssl_stapling_ocsp_handler(ngx_ssl_oc
         goto error;
     }
 
-    valid = ngx_ssl_stapling_time(nextupdate);
-    if (valid == (time_t) NGX_ERROR) {
-        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, ctx->log, 0,
-                      "invalid nextUpdate time in certificate status");
-        goto error;
+    if (nextupdate) {
+        valid = ngx_ssl_stapling_time(nextupdate);
+        if (valid == (time_t) NGX_ERROR) {
+            ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, ctx->log, 0,
+                          "invalid nextUpdate time in certificate status");
+            goto error;
+        }
+
+    } else {
+        valid = NGX_MAX_TIME_T_VALUE;
     }
 
     OCSP_CERTID_free(id);